The interpretation of observational epidemiological studies offers both promise and peril. 1,2 Aetiological hypotheses with public health implications may gain support from these studies which in turn are subject to many alternative interpretations, especially bias and confounding. Traditionally, epidemiologists have used a mostly qualitative narrative review technique that includes causal criteria-strength, consistency, plausibility, dose-response and others-as well as considerations such as bias, confounding, and study designs. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] How meta-analysis can help solve this difficult interpretative problem is not immediately obvious. In a recent paper in this Journal, for example, traditional narrative reviews and metaanalyses are portrayed as methodological alternatives, each with strengths and weaknesses. 10 Others argue that a systematic review may include a meta-analysis but that it should not be a prominent component of that review. 11 A key unexamined concern is the relationship between metaanalysis and criteria-based methods of causal inference. This paper describes how these two methods-one more quantitative and the other more qualitative-can be used together in causal assessments.
authors claimed that several thousand breast cancer deaths each year can be attributed to induced abortion. Another review of the same evidence-sans meta-analysis and published almost simultaneously-concluded that there was no association between induced abortion and breast cancer much less a causal one. 13 Indeed, causal claims may appear in published narrative reviews in which meta-analysis is not performed; these claims arise from the use of methods with the traditional causal criteria at their core. 14 Finally, some causal claims appear to arise from meta-analysis alone with minimal reference to causal inference methods and in the absence of a systematic narrative review. 15 Such a wide range of practices provides no firm basis upon which the relationship between meta-analytical and causal inference methods can be teased out. Turning to theoretical accounts, however, is only marginally helpful. Many commentators have cautioned that meta-analysis may not yet be ready for widespread use, especially for observational studies. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] Beyond that, the main concern of methodologists is less about the role of meta-analysis in assessing causation than it is about the synthetic approach to meta-analysis that emphasizes summarization of evidence over the search for heterogeneity. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] On the topic of causation, for example, a recent paper notes only that statistical methods alone cannot provide a causal explanation of associations. 23 A recent text argues that metaanalysis of observational data does not provide good evidence of causation because competing hypotheses (e.g. bias and confounding) cannot be ruled out. 28 From these accounts, it is reasonable to conclude only that meta-analysis may not, by itself, provide enough information to warrant a causal claim. Although this conclusion calls into question one practice described earlier, it does not provide much help in determining the extent to which meta-analysis makes causal claims easier or more difficult. A look at the finer structure of causal inference methods, the individual causal criteria, provides clues.
Meta-analysis and Criteria of Causation

Consistency
One of the most frequently used criteria in the practice of causal inference 14 is consistency, the extent to which the association is observed in different circumstances, by different investigators, using different study designs, and in different locations. 6 Consistency is the epidemiologist's expanded equivalent of the experimentalist's search for replicability, 29 although for observational studies, replication of findings in the face of different, rather than similar, circumstances is more highly valued. 8, 30, 31 Without meta-analysis, reviewers often assess consistency with simple quantitative summarizing techniques, tallying up the per cent of studies that are positive and then utilizing a ruleof-thumb for declaring them consistent: a simple majority in some cases, a higher threshold in others. 32 Indeed, it has been shown that in some controversial, high-profile situations, different rules-of-thumb for consistency (coupled with its relatively high prioritization among causal considerations) have contributed to vastly different, even exactly opposite, causal judgements. 33 To examine whether meta-analysis can provide a less subjective assessment of consistency requires a look at how summarization of effect estimates across studies occurs; assessing heterogeneity is a key consideration.
Heterogeneity tests assess the extent to which the studies are similar enough to warrant summarization. When a lack of statistical heterogeneity across all studies occurs, a weighted average of the estimated effect size (under one or another statistical model) seems a defensible and reproducible way to approach the assessment of consistency and therefore likely better than the rules-of-thumb used in the practice of causal inference.
When heterogeneity exists, however, then exploring its sources 11 will not only guard against the concerns that metaanalysis too often buries important inconsistencies in statistical aggregations 19 but will also provide relevant information for the practice of causal inference. For example, summarization of results within heterogeneous groups provides estimates of the overall effect by measurement technique, study design, population studied, or other sources of the observed heterogeneity, although the extent to which each heterogeneous group estimate represents bias (or not) may be a matter, like so much else in causal inference, of judgement.
Heterogeneity, however, does not necessarily preclude a conclusion of consistency in causal inference. Consider a hypothetical situation in which meta-analysis reveals heterogeneous groups of summarizable studies each of which (i.e. each group) has a statistically significant estimate in the same direction although of different magnitudes. A more extreme example can be imagined in which no known covariates are associated with variation in the study results, yet the results of all individual studies show strong effect sizes (and are heterogeneous). In both instances, it is too simplistic a rule to declare that evidence of heterogeneity disallows a causal judgement due to a lack of consistency. 23 Indeed, in these instances, it may be reasonable to argue that the results are both consistent (i.e. consistently greater than 1.0) and heterogeneous.
Biological plausibility
The extent to which an observed association in epidemiological studies is supported or not by what is known about the mechanism of action and the underlying disease process is commonly referred to as biological plausibility or sometimes coherence. 34 In metaphorical terms, assessing this causal criterion is like opening a window into the many-tiered structure of biological knowledge pertinent to the aetiology of disease: cellular and subcellular systems, experimental animal models, physiological parameters and genetic or other biomarkers. 35 Inasmuch as several similar studies may examine the same biological parameters, meta-analysis could assist in summarizing information and in identifying heterogeneity analogous to the way in which it is used for randomized clinical trials and for epidemiological studies. 36 A recent example involved the role of MDR1/gp170 expression in breast cancer tumour samples wherein substantial heterogeneity was linked to differences in assay techniques. 37 This uncommon application of meta-analysis is a step towards a more systematic approach to the assessment of biological evidence, although it seems unlikely that meta-analysis in its current quantitative form will be useful for summarizing different kinds of studies from different levels of biological knowledge.
Strength of association and dose-response
There is an important distinction to be made between improving the precision of the relative risk estimate-which metaanalysis offers-and interpreting the causal relevance of the absolute value of the summarized estimate-which it does not. 11, 18, 20, 38 Simply put, the practitioner of causal inference, having completed a meta-analysis, remains faced with the problem of judging whether the summarized estimate-small (i.e. weak) or large (i.e. strong)-can be explained by confounding or bias. Thus it is reasonable to accept a relative risk estimate of 2.0 emerging from a meta-analysis as a better estimate than that which we may have opined through a judicious application of our 'judgement', somehow estimating a summary average value from a long list of single study estimates. Nevertheless, that same conclusion, emerging as it does from a meta-analysis, provides no additional warrant for a causal claim. Put another way, a summary estimate of 2.0-whether it emerges from a meta-analysis or not-remains on the borderline of what is typically called a 'weak' association. The same argument applies to dose-response curves, 39 which can also be made more precise by judicious application of meta-analysis. Nevertheless, whatever the form of those curves-increasing, decreasing, 'S' or 'J', shaped-the practitioner of causal inference is left with the task of explaining them in terms of the biological sense of the revealed pattern, potential biases, and other concerns.
Other criteria
Specificity, temporality, and analogy are less frequently employed criteria, but are nevertheless a part of the rich historical tradition of causal inference methods. 32 Meta-analysis has indirect connections to the consideration of specificity; it is possible that one group of studies will have a summarizable effect estimate that differs from another because the exposure (or disease) was measured more narrowly. Meta-analysis may also provide a way to summarize evidence that examines the relationships of timerelated variables to outcomes, but it is not clear that meta-analysis has important implications for the classic consideration of the temporal order of cause and effect nor for the criterion of analogy.
Meta-analysis, Confounding, and Bias
Causal criteria may be central to causal assessments of epidemiological evidence, but other concerns, especially confounding and bias, are also important. The extent to which meta-analysis can assist in the assessment of confounding and bias is closely related to the capacity for meta-analysis to reveal heterogeneity among studies. Potential sources of heterogeneity include study design differences, exposure assessment differences, confounders (known and unknown), and bias. 11, [24] [25] [26] Publication bias is another concern in the practice of metaanalysis that could potentially affect interpretation of results. 24 
Conclusion
Both causal inference methods and meta-analysis can appear within the context of a systematic review, the latter characterized by a clearly stated purpose, careful literature searches, explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria, assessments of study validity and thus bias, and well-articulated definitions and rules of inference for selected causal criteria. 4, 5 Several important causal criteria may be determined or made more precise through quantitative assessments of heterogeneity and summarization of effects, in particular, using meta-analyses of groups of studies from observational or biological levels of knowledge.
Thus meta-analysis has an important role to play in causal assessments, although meta-analysis alone is not sufficient for making causal claims. Meta-analysis provides a more formal statistical approach to the criterion of consistency as well as a way to identify heterogeneous groups of studies, whether epidemiological or biological in origin. It also can provide more precise estimates of the magnitude of the effect estimate and of dose-response relationships. These are the clearest and perhaps most important links between the quantitative method of metaanalysis and the more qualitative method of causal inference.
Discussion
These conclusions imply that practitioners of meta-analysis should refrain from making causal claims without first considering the issues brought out by applying the largely qualitative causal inference methods. Practitioners of causal inference, on the other hand, should recognise the strengths and limitations of applying meta-analysis to epidemiological evidence and understand that melding the quantitative and qualitative components of these methods within the context of a systematic review is helpful and yet also only a rough solution to a longstanding methodological problem. 9 Indeed, the scope of the problem of making causal claims from scientific evidence is widening. Recently, some have argued that an understanding of the determinants and distribution of disease will be improved by examining not only epidemiological and biological evidence but also social evidence for causation. [40] [41] [42] Causal inference, in this expanded context, will require both an ability to combine studies within the social arena, but perhaps as importantly, to assess evidence across many levels of scientific knowledge from the molecular to the social, with classic epidemiology near the middle. Following the arguments above, meta-analysis in its current form cannot be a solution because it requires that studies be reasonably similar in design and in measurements of effect, two characteristics not shared by studies of, say, DNA repair mechanisms in tumour cell lines, tissue biomarker levels in mice exposed to an environmental insult, case-control studies of cancer in workers exposed to potential carcinogens, and analyses of the impact of income or class differences on selection processes into and out of jobs in hazardous workplaces. Indeed, making inferences across many levels of scientific knowledge may require a systems-based approach 43, 44 not captured by the methods discussed here.
